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_______________ 
OPINION OF THE COURT 
_______________ 
BIBAS, Circuit Judge.  
In law, as in life, the path often matters as much as the des-
tination. For an alien challenging his removal, that path begins 
with a petition for review of his removal order, not a habeas 
petition. 
Syed Tazu challenged when and how the Attorney General 
sought to remove him. But he lost his way by doing so in the 
wrong proceeding in the wrong court. He filed a habeas peti-
tion, asking the District Court to stop the Attorney General 
from executing his valid removal order while he tries to reopen 
his removal proceedings and to get a Provisional Unlawful 
Presence Waiver. But 8 U.S.C. § 1252(g) strips us of jurisdic-
tion to review any “decision or action by the Attorney General 
to . . . execute removal orders against any alien.” And 
§ 1252(b)(9) makes a petition for review—not a habeas peti-
tion—the exclusive way to challenge “any action taken or pro-
ceeding brought to remove an alien.” Those provisions funnel 
Tazu’s claims to the Second Circuit, not us. We will thus re-
verse and remand for the District Court to dismiss for lack of 
subject-matter jurisdiction. 
Still, the wheels of justice turn elsewhere. Tazu has a peti-
tion for review pending in the Second Circuit. His removal is 
stayed while that litigation is pending, so he can remain with 
his wife and children. And we have every confidence that our 
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sister circuit will consider Tazu’s claim that he endured inef-




In 1993, Tazu left his native Bangladesh, traveled to Mex-
ico, and crossed into the United States without inspection. He 
promptly applied for asylum based on political persecution. 
Eight years later, in his removal proceeding, an immigration 
judge denied that application. But rather than ordering his re-
moval, the immigration judge granted his request to depart vol-
untarily. 
Tazu appealed to the Board of Immigration Appeals, alleg-
ing ineffective assistance of counsel. In 2003, the Board denied 
his appeal but gave him thirty days to depart. Because he did 
not leave, his grant of voluntary departure became an order of 
removal. Nearly six years later, immigration agents detained 
him to remove him. 
While detained, Tazu filed his first motion to reopen his 
removal proceedings. The Board denied it. The Government 
then tried to execute the removal order by releasing him on a 
plane to Bangladesh. But because his passport had expired, the 
airline would not let him board the plane. The Government 
asked the Bangladeshi consulate to issue Tazu a new passport, 
but it seemed “[un]likel[y] that a passport w[ould] be issued in 
the foreseeable future.” App. 536. So in 2009, the Government 
let him go on supervised release.  
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For the next decade, Tazu complied fully with the terms of 
his supervised release. He “never missed” any of his required 
appointments to check in with the Government. App. 6. He 
held a steady job, paid taxes, raised his three children, and fol-
lowed the law.  
During this time, he also learned of a way to stay in the 
United States lawfully: by getting a provisional waiver. With-
out one, Tazu’s eventual removal would likely prevent him 
from reentering the United States for years. 78 Fed. Reg. 536-
01, 536–38 (Jan. 3, 2013). With one, he would spend far less 
time separated from his family in the United States. Id.; see 8 
C.F.R. § 212.7(e)(4)(iv) (making aliens subject to final orders 
of removal, like Tazu, eligible for provisional waivers). 
To get a waiver, he first needed a relative to file a Form  
I-130 “Petition for Alien Relative.” 78 Fed. Reg. at 547–48 & 
n.9. Next, he needed to file a Form I-212 “Application for Per-
mission to Reapply for Admission.” See id. at 548 (8 C.F.R. 
§ 212.7(e)(4)(iv)). Only after the Government approved those 
two applications could he file a Form I-601a “Application for 
Provisional Unlawful Presence Waiver.” See id. at 537 (8 
C.F.R. § 212.7(e)). 
Tazu’s family took the first of these three steps. In 2017, 
one of his sons, a U.S. citizen, filed a Form I-130 for him. It 
was approved later that year. But Tazu did not file a Form I-
212 right away. 
In early 2019, the Government finally got Tazu’s renewed 
passport. Three days later, it re-detained him to execute his re-
moval order.  
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B. Procedural history 
A month later, Tazu sued the Government in the U.S. Dis-
trict Court for the District of New Jersey, seeking release from 
detention by a writ of habeas corpus and a stay of removal. He 
then filed his Form I-212 with the Department of Homeland 
Security and moved to reopen his removal proceedings with 
the Board based on ineffective assistance of counsel. But he 
lost on every front. The District Court declined to grant either 
a writ of habeas corpus or a stay of removal. The Department 
of Homeland Security denied his I-212 application. And the 
Board denied his motion to reopen.  
Tazu appealed each of these adverse determinations. He 
challenged the denial of his Form I-212 before the Department 
of Homeland Security’s Administrative Appeals Office. He 
challenged the Board’s refusal to reopen his proceedings by 
petitioning for review with the Second Circuit. See Tazu v. 
Barr, No. 19-3824 (2d Cir. docketed Nov. 15, 2019). Because 
the Department of Homeland Security has a longstanding “for-
bearance policy” with the Second Circuit, Tazu will not be re-
moved until that Court resolves his petition for review. In re 
Immigration Petitions for Review Pending in U.S. Court of Ap-
peals for Second Circuit, 702 F.3d 160, 162 (2d Cir. 2012). 
C. This appeal 
That brings us to this appeal from the District Court’s de-
nial of habeas corpus relief or a stay of removal. On appeal, 
Tazu raises two challenges to the execution of his removal or-
der. Though he couches his claims in both statutory and con-
stitutional terms, he clothes both in the garb of due process. 
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First, he challenges the timing of his removal, asserting that 
removing him now would interfere with his due process right 
to stay here while applying for a provisional waiver and ap-
pealing the denial of his motion to reopen. Second, he chal-
lenges his detention, arguing that the Government violated its 
own regulations and thus due process by detaining him without 
notice, a revocation interview, and an orderly departure.  
To decide whether the District Court had jurisdiction, we 
construe 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(9) and (g). “Whether or not the 
District Court had jurisdiction, we have jurisdiction under 28 
U.S.C. § 1291 to review its decision” about subject-matter ju-
risdiction. E.O.H.C. v. Sec’y U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 950 
F.3d 177, 182 (3d Cir. 2020). We review de novo. Id. at 182–
83. 
II. THE DISTRICT COURT LACKED JURISDICTION TO  
REVIEW TAZU’S TIMING CHALLENGE 
Tazu first argues that the Attorney General cannot execute 
his removal order now. He asks us to hold that the Attorney 
General must wait until later—after he finishes exhausting the 
provisional-waiver process and appealing the denial of his mo-
tion to reopen. Though his challenge may be a fine one, it does 
not belong in this proceeding. He can raise it elsewhere and 
must do that in his petition for review before the Second Cir-
cuit.  
A. 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(9) and (g) channel review of 
three specific actions to a single court of appeals 
In 1996, Congress amended the Immigration and National-
ity Act to add § 1252(b)(9) and (g). It aimed to prevent removal 
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proceedings from becoming “fragment[ed], and hence pro-
long[ed].” Reno v. Am.-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm., 525 
U.S. 471, 487 (1999) (Am.-Arab). And it did so by funneling 
“most claims that even relate to removal” into a single proceed-
ing, which begins with a petition for review of a final removal 
order in the appropriate court of appeals. E.O.H.C., 950 F.3d 
at 180, 184. 
Congress used complementary provisions to funnel re-
moval-related claims away from district courts and into a peti-
tion for review in a single court of appeals. See § 1252(b)(9), 
(g). Sometimes, the provisions overlap. See Am.-Arab, 525 
U.S. at 483. But even the narrower one, § 1252(g), plays an im-
portant role. It directs other courts not to hear challenges to 
three of the Attorney General’s “decision[s] or action[s]”: 
those that “commence proceedings, adjudicate cases, or exe-
cute removal orders.” § 1252(g).  
Section 1252(g) does not sweep broadly. It reaches only 
these three specific actions, not everything that arises out of 
them. See Jennings v. Rodriguez, 138 S. Ct. 830, 840–41 
(2018) (plurality opinion) (interpreting Am.-Arab, 525 U.S. at 
482–83); see also Garcia v. Att’y Gen. of the U.S., 553 F.3d 
724, 729 (3d Cir. 2009). If an alien challenges one of those 
discrete actions, § 1252(g) funnels jurisdiction over that chal-
lenge into a petition for review in a single court of appeals. 
Whether the claim is constitutional or statutory, no other court 
of appeals has jurisdiction to hear it. See Elgharib v. Napoli-
tano, 600 F.3d 597, 602, 605 (6th Cir. 2010) (collecting cases); 
Sissoko v. Rocha, 509 F.3d 947, 950–51 (9th Cir. 2007) (bar-
ring review of a Fourth Amendment false-arrest claim because 
9 
the claim “directly challenge[d] [the] decision to commence 
expedited removal proceedings” ); Humphries v. Various Fed. 
USINS Emps., 164 F.3d 936, 945 (5th Cir. 1999) (barring re-
view of an alien’s First Amendment retaliation claim based on 
the Attorney General’s decision to put him into exclusion pro-
ceedings). 
B. Tazu challenges one of those three actions: the  
execution of his removal order 
Tazu challenges the third act listed in § 1252(g): the Attor-
ney General’s “action . . . to . . . execute [his] removal order[ ] .” 
The statute funnels his claim into his petition for review before 
the Second Circuit. He tries to sidestep the statute’s funnel by 
saying that he “does not contest the discretion exercised to re-
move him.” Pet’r’s Br. 28. Though the Attorney General ad-
mittedly has discretion to execute his removal order later, Tazu 
claims, he allegedly lacks the authority to exercise that discre-
tion now. But Tazu’s claim cannot evade the statute’s reach. 
1. The plain text of § 1252(g) covers decisions about 
whether and when to execute a removal order. Tazu claims that 
deciding to execute a removal order now differs from deciding 
to do so at some point. But both are “decision[s] or action[s] 
. . . to . . . execute removal orders.” § 1252(g). After all, “the act 
of deciding” means “the act of settling or terminating (as a con-
test or controversy) by giving judgment.” Decision, Webster’s 
Third New International Dictionary (1966). And to settle or 
terminate the execution of a removal order, the Attorney Gen-
eral must choose a date for that removal. So the discretion to 
decide whether to execute a removal order includes the 
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discretion to decide when to do it. Jimenez-Angeles v. Ashcroft, 
291 F.3d 594, 599 (9th Cir. 2002). Both are covered by the 
statute. 
2. The design of § 1252(g) shows that Tazu cannot chal-
lenge the timing of his removal here. As the Supreme Court has 
noted, “Section 1252(g) was directed against a particular evil: 
attempts to impose judicial constraints upon prosecutorial dis-
cretion.” Am.-Arab, 525 U.S. at 485 n.9. It “seems clearly de-
signed to give some measure of protection to ‘no deferred ac-
tion’ decisions and similar discretionary determinations.” Id. at 
485. “[I]f they are reviewable at all, they at least will not be 
made the bases for separate rounds of judicial intervention out-
side the streamlined process that Congress has designed.” Id. 
The Attorney General may thus decide to execute Tazu’s valid 
removal order when he chooses. The statute shields that pros-
ecutorial discretion from judicial review apart from a petition 
for review. 
3. Tazu challenges the Attorney General’s discretion, not 
his authority under the INA. Tazu seeks to undermine that de-
sign by styling his constitutional and statutory objections as 
challenging not the Executive’s discretion, but its authority to 
execute his removal order. We have held that unless the Attor-
ney General first has authority under the Immigration and Na-
tionality Act to remove an alien, § 1252(g) cannot shield the 
Attorney General’s discretionary use of that authority. See 
Garcia, 553 F.3d at 729. Tazu reads Garcia as letting him file 
a habeas petition to challenge the execution of any removal or-
der that might trigger allegedly unlawful effects. But it does 
not.  
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Garcia states the obvious: what the Act gives, it can also 
take away. There, we held that § 1252(g) does not thwart our 
power to declare that the Attorney General lacks the power to 
start removal proceedings. 553 F.3d at 726–27, 729. In that 
case, an alien had become a lawful permanent resident by 
falsely claiming that she derived citizenship from her mother, 
a U.S. citizen. Id. at 726. But the woman she named was not 
her mother. Id. When the Government found out eight years 
later, it started removal proceedings. Id. But another provision 
of the Act bars the Government from rescinding a status change 
and removing an alien if it does not act within five years. Id. 
(discussing 8 U.S.C. § 1256(a)). 
Before us, the Government framed Garcia’s claim as chal-
lenging the Attorney General’s discretion to start removal pro-
ceedings, which § 1252(g) shields. 553 F.3d at 728–29. We dis-
agreed. Instead, we held that Garcia was challenging the Attor-
ney General’s statutory “authority to commence those pro-
ceedings” in the first place. Id. at 729 (emphasis in original). 
In other words, when the Act deprives the Attorney General of 
the discretion to act, a challenge to that lack of statutory au-
thority is not barred as a challenge to the exercise of discretion. 
Garcia addressed only a case in which the Act itself took away 
the Attorney General’s authority. It does not reach Tazu’s 
claims under other provisions. 
Tazu points to no flaw in the Attorney General’s statutory 
authority to remove him. See Pet’r’s Br. 26, 28. Nor does he 
challenge the existence of his removal order. See Madu v. U.S. 
Att’y Gen., 470 F.3d 1362, 1363, 1368 (11th Cir. 2006) (hold-
ing that § 1252(g) does not reach such challenges). Nor does he 
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challenge Government actions taken before the Attorney Gen-
eral tried to execute that order. Kwai Fun Wong v. United 
States, 373 F.3d 952, 965 (9th Cir. 2004) (reading § 1252(g) as 
not reaching such challenges). We have no occasion to con-
sider such claims. 
Any other rule would gut § 1252(g). Future petitioners 
could restyle any challenge to the three actions listed in 
§ 1252(g) as a challenge to the Executive’s general lack of au-
thority to violate due process, equal protection, the Adminis-
trative Procedure Act, or some other federal law. That would 
also contravene the Supreme Court’s holding in American-
Arab Anti-Discrimination Committee, which funneled review 
even of constitutional challenges into a single petition for re-
view filed with the appropriate court of appeals. 525 U.S. at 
483, 485. Thus, the Second Circuit can consider those claims 
as part of a petition for review. But we cannot.  
III. THE DISTRICT COURT ALSO LACKED JURISDICTION TO 
REVIEW TAZU’S DETENTION CLAIM 
Tazu also challenges the Government’s re-detaining him 
for prompt removal. The Government, he notes, ended his su-
pervision period without first giving him notice and a revoca-
tion interview. By doing so, he argues, it violated the agency’s 
rules and thus due process. See 8 C.F.R. § 241.4(l)(1). While 
this claim does not challenge the Attorney General’s decision 
to execute his removal order, it does attack the action taken to 
execute that order. So under § 1252(g) and (b)(9), the District 
Court lacked jurisdiction to review it. 
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A. Section 1252(g) strips us of jurisdiction over the act 
of executing a removal order; that act includes 
Tazu’s short re-detention  
The text of § 1252(g) resolves this claim. It strips us of ju-
risdiction to review the Attorney General’s “decision or action 
. . . to . . . execute [a] removal order[ ] ” (emphasis added). 
Tazu’s challenge to his short re-detention for removal attacks 
a key part of executing his removal order. The verb “execute” 
means “[t]o perform or complete.” Execute, Black’s Law Dic-
tionary (11th ed. 2019). And to perform or complete a removal, 
the Attorney General must exercise his discretionary power to 
detain an alien for a few days. That detention does not fall 
within some other “part of the deportation process.” Am.-Arab, 
525 U.S. at 482. We thus hold that a brief door-to-plane deten-
tion is integral to the act of “execut[ing] [a] removal order[ ] .”  
The Government re-detained Tazu just three days after it 
got his new passport. If courts had not intervened, it would 
have removed him just three-and-a-half weeks after re-detain-
ing him. Re-detaining Tazu was simply the enforcement mech-
anism the Attorney General picked to execute his removal. So 
§ 1252(g) funnels review away from the District Court and this 
Court. 
B. Section 1252(b)(9) also eliminates the District 
Court’s jurisdiction over Tazu’s re-detention claim, 
as it “arises from” an action taken to execute his  
removal  
Though § 1252(g) does independent work, it can overlap 
with § 1252(b)(9). Am.-Arab, 525 U.S. at 483–84. The latter 
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provision states that if a claim “aris[es] from any action taken 
or proceeding brought to remove an alien,” then review of that 
claim “shall be available only in judicial review of a final or-
der.” In other words, § 1252(b)(9) funnels that claim into a pe-
tition for review. 
To remove an alien means to send him back permanently to 
his home country. E.O.H.C., 950 F.3d at 184. Tazu’s claim 
arises out of the action to remove him. In E.O.H.C., we held 
that sending Guatemalans to Mexico temporarily to await the 
outcome of their pending asylum application did not “arise 
from” an action to remove them because it was “not part of the 
process of remov[ing] [them] to Guatemala.” Id. Here, by con-
trast, Tazu’s brief re-detention was part of sending him back to 
Bangladesh. And the legal questions he raises about the scope 
of the Attorney General’s discretion to re-detain him are bound 
up with (and thus “aris[e] from”) an “action taken” to remove 
him there. See, e.g., Aguilar v. U.S. ICE, 510 F.3d 1, 13–14 (1st 
Cir. 2007) (holding that § 1252(b)(9) funneled an ineffective-
assistance challenge into a petition for review because the chal-
lenge was “inextricably intertwined with” the alien’s “removal 
proceeding”). 
Section 1252(b)(9) does not foreclose all claims by an im-
migration detainee. If Tazu had challenged the length of his 
confinement, for instance, he could have pursued that chal-
lenge outside a petition for review. See E.O.H.C., 950 F.3d at 
186. That is because prolonged detention suggests that removal 
is not reasonably foreseeable. See Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 
510, 527 (2003) (distinguishing detention once removal is “no 
longer practically attainable” from detention when removal is 
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imminent) (quoting Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 690 
(2001)). Challenges to the length or conditions of an alien’s 
confinement are not directly about removal. “For these claims, 
review is now or never.” E.O.H.C., 950 F.3d at 180. So the Act 
does not funnel them into a petition for review. 
Here, by contrast, Tazu’s re-detention challenge is directly 
about removal. So whether we analyze it under § 1252(g) or 
§ 1252(b)(9), the outcome is the same: the District Court lacked 
jurisdiction to hear it. 
IV. NEITHER § 1252(G) NOR § 1252(B)(9) IS  
UNCONSTITUTIONAL AS APPLIED 
Because Tazu’s claims sound in due process, barring all ju-
dicial review could raise constitutional concerns. But he can 
raise all his claims in a petition for review. See § 1252(a)(2)(D). 
There is no constitutional problem with funneling them there. 
Congress designed the petition-for-review process to han-
dle attacks on “any action taken . . . to remove an alien.” 
§ 1252(b)(9). Indeed, “most claims that even relate to removal” 
must be brought in a single petition for review after a final re-
moval order. E.O.H.C., 950 F.3d at 184. That includes chal-
lenges to the validity of the removal order. Nasrallah v. Barr, 
140 S. Ct. 1683, 1691 (2020) (citing INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 
919, 938 (1983)). It also includes claims that, while distinct 
from the final order itself, are so directly tied to the process of 
removal that Congress decided they should be reviewed along-
side the final order of removal. See id. at 1691–92 (Convention 
Against Torture claims); see also § 1252(b)(9) (claims “arising 
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from any action taken or proceeding brought to remove an al-
ien”). 
Tazu challenges actions taken to remove him. By challeng-
ing the timing of his removal, he tries to thwart the removal 
itself. The same is true of his challenge to his re-detention. He 
can thus raise his claims in a petition for review. Because both 
challenges raise “constitutional claims or questions of law,” ju-
risdiction to hear them in a petition for review “is never limited 
or eliminated.” McAllister v. Att’y Gen. of the U.S., 444 F.3d 
178, 183 (3d Cir. 2006) (citing § 1252(a)(2)(D)). 
Tazu has no constitutional right to more review than that. 
We have already held that a petition for review is an adequate 
substitute for a petitioner’s historic right to habeas corpus. 
Verde-Rodriguez v. Att’y Gen. of the U.S., 734 F.3d 198, 207 
(3d Cir. 2013). Judicial review of motions to reopen covers the 
same kinds of issues and offers roughly the same safeguards 
and scope of review as habeas. Luna v. Holder, 637 F.3d 85, 
99 (2d Cir. 2011). And Tazu’s constitutional right to habeas 
likely guarantees him no more than the relief he hopes to 
avoid—release into “the cabin of a plane bound for [Bangla-
desh].” Dep’t of Homeland Sec. v. Thuraissigiam, 140 S. Ct. 
1959, 1970 (2020). Fortunately, his removal is already stayed 
before the Second Circuit. We trust that he will be able to stay 
here with his family while he seeks relief.  
* * * * * 
By raising his claims in the wrong proceeding, Tazu chose 
a path that cannot lead to relief. He demands that the Attorney 
General wait before removing him. And he contests how the 
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Government re-detained him to remove him promptly. But 
both claims challenge the act of executing his removal order. 
So under § 1252(g) and (b)(9), we and the District Court lack 
jurisdiction. He can pursue both claims, of course, but not here. 
He must raise them in his petition for review before the Second 
Circuit. We will thus reverse and remand with instructions to 
dismiss for lack of jurisdiction. 
